The Missing Paper Trail Behind Nigeria’s Next Satellite Programme

 

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The Missing Paper Trail Behind Nigeria’s

Next Satellite Programme

Nigeria is preparing to replace NIGCOMSAT 1R, its main communications satellite, as the spacecraft approaches the end of its stated 15-year design life. But documents reviewed for this investigation leave several links in the paper trail behind its proposed replacement programme unexplained.

On 11 May 2026, the House of Representatives Committee on Digital and Communication Technology directed NIGCOMSAT to suspend or cancel a planned visit by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), citing concerns about access to physical and digital infrastructure, security and procurement. 

Records reviewed by this investigation indicate that IAI representatives nevertheless visited NIGCOMSAT on 11 and 12 May.

An August 2025 Federal Executive Council memorandum had earlier authorised a financing framework for two new communications satellites, including a special purpose vehicle in which the Federal Government would hold 49 percent and private investors 51 percent. It also contemplated financing from export credit agencies, development finance institutions and sovereign wealth funds.

The memorandum did not name IAI or Thales Alenia Space, the companies later associated with the programme. 

A separate Bureau of Public Procurement certificate issued in 2012 concerns an earlier NIGCOMSAT procurement involving China Great Wall Industry Corporation. Then, on 8 September 2026, NIGCOMSAT and IAI signed an agreement at the Embassy of Israel in Abuja.

None of these documents, on its own, establishes wrongdoing. The question is whether the available records show how the different stages connect: from government approval to procurement, vendor selection, contractual commitments and financing.

The IAI visit and September agreement

In a letter dated 11 May 2026 and referenced NASS/10HR/CT.62/5/092, the House committee directed the NIGCOMSAT managing director to suspend or cancel the planned IAI visit.

Copies were sent to the Office of the National Security Adviser, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, the Minister of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy and the Director General of the Bureau of Public Procurement.The committee raised concerns about access to NIGCOMSAT's physical and digital infrastructure, security and procurement.

Yet records indicate that IAI representatives were at NIGCOMSAT on 11 and 12 May.  That does not establish that NIGCOMSAT disregarded the directive. The committee's position may have subsequently been varied, superseded or otherwise resolved. But the available records do not show who authorised the visit after the letter was issued or whether additional clearance was obtained.

Ladi Okuneye, a satellite industry professional who said during a 5 October TVC News interview that he had consulted for the House committee on some of the issues, also questioned the circumstances.

Okuneye said he would rather not comment on matters he did not know directly, but described it as concerning that such a visit could have been entertained without clearance from relevant oversight and security agencies. He said he was not aware of any change to the committee's position, while acknowledging that he might not have been aware of subsequent developments.

The same company later entered into an agreement with NIGCOMSAT.

On 8 September, NIGCOMSAT and IAI signed the agreement at the Embassy of Israel in Abuja. The Minister of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy had been invited but was reportedly travelling to India for the BRICS summit, with a representative attending in his place.

The key questions are what the agreement legally represented, who had authority to execute it, what approvals preceded the signing and whether it created financial or other obligations.

The gap between FEC approval and vendor selection

The August 2025 FEC memorandum authorised NIGCOMSAT to establish a special purpose vehicle for two communications satellites under a private participation structure. 

It set out the financing framework but did not name the companies that would ultimately supply the satellites.

NIGCOMSAT has said the companies selected were the most qualified and that due process was followed.

The issue, therefore, is whether there is a documentary bridge between the framework approved by FEC and the subsequent selection of the companies now involved. 

That bridge would ordinarily be found in procurement records, evaluation reports, approvals and relevant certificates. Such records would show what process was used, which companies were considered, how they were evaluated and what approvals were required before commitments were made.

The 2012 BPP certificate

A Bureau of Public Procurement certificate dated 23 October 2012, referenced BPP/RPT/12/Vol.I/231, concerns the procurement of NIGCOMSAT 2 and NIGCOMSAT 3 and identifies China Great Wall Industry Corporation as the beneficiary.

The stated contract value was US$691.387 million, equivalent at the time to about N107.345 Billion. 

The certificate predates the current programme and does not name IAI or Thales Alenia Space.

The documents reviewed do not establish that the certificate was used to authorise any part of the present replacement programme. The question is whether it was relied upon in any current process or whether a separate, current BPP approval exists for the programme now being implemented.

The value of the orbital positions

Another strand concerns orbital positions that NIGCOMSAT has presented as having substantial value.

Presidential intervention memoranda reviewed for this investigation show requests totalling US 6.987 million for activities associated with the 9.5°W and 16°W positions. The documents describe the relevant assets as 300 million.

The basis for that valuation is not clear from the material reviewed. An orbital filing does not necessarily have a straightforward commercial value. Its value can depend on regulatory status, spectrum coordination, technical requirements and the ability to bring a satellite into operation within the relevant regulatory framework.

The questions are therefore how NIGCOMSAT arrived at the stated US 300 million valuation, what the US 6.987 million was intended to secure or preserve and what documentation supports those figures.

Questions about the satellite itself

The documentary questions are accompanied by concerns about the technical case for the replacement programme.

During his TVC News interview, Okuneye questioned whether the specifications underlying the programme are suited to Nigeria's current connectivity needs.

He described the 2024 tender specifications he said he had reviewed as “a very, very legacy design” and argued that Nigeria should consider a multi-orbit strategy combining geostationary and low-Earth-orbit satellites.

He also questioned the proposed capacity. Based on the designs submitted by tender respondents, Okuneye said he believed the satellites could serve about two to three million Nigerians. He said this was his assessment and that it would need to be tested against the tender documents, technical proposals and NIGCOMSAT's own projections.

He also claimed that NIGCOMSAT 1R operates at about 7 per cent utilisation. 

“The existing satellite is only at about 7% utilisation,” he said, questioning what the roadmap would be for increasing utilisation and why the outcome would be different under the new

programme.

The figure would need to be independently verified against NIGCOMSAT's operational records, transponder usage and commercial utilisation data.

Okuneye also questioned the project's business model, including how additional capacity would generate revenue and whether the programme could deliver an adequate return on the proposed investment.

These comments do not establish that the procurement process was improper. They raise questions about whether the technical design and commercial model support the scale of the proposed investment.

The timing problem

There is also a question of whether the replacement programme can be completed before NIGCOMSAT 1R becomes unavailable.

NIGCOMSAT 1R was launched in December 2011 with a stated design life of 15 years. Reaching the end of that period does not necessarily mean the spacecraft will stop operating

immediately, but a replacement still requires financing, procurement, manufacturing, launch and commissioning.

Documents reviewed for this investigation put the manufacturing and launch period for a replacement spacecraft at roughly 27 to 39 months.

Okuneye questioned whether the current public timeline provides a realistic transition.“I do not think the existing timeline is realistic, and we do need to have a stop-gap solution in

place,” he said.

NIGCOMSAT therefore needs to explain how services currently supported by 1R will be maintained while the replacement satellites move through the various stages of delivery.

What remains to be established

The records leave several questions that can be answered through the documentary trail. NIGCOMSAT needs to clarify the authority under which the May IAI visit proceeded after the House committee's directive, the procurement process through which the current satellite contractors were selected and whether the 2012 BPP certificate has any connection to the present programme.

It should also set out the legal and approval basis for the September agreement with IAI and explain the methodology behind the stated US$300 million value attached to the orbital positions.

The Ministry of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy and the Bureau of Public Procurement also have roles in the approval and procurement chain that should be clear from the records.

Finally, NIGCOMSAT needs to set out its continuity arrangements for services currently supported by NIGCOMSAT 1R and show how they align with the timetable for the replacement satellites.

The answers may close the apparent gaps in the record. They may also show that some decisions were supported by approvals or documents not yet available for review. For a programme involving strategic infrastructure, international contractors and public financing, the distinction matters.

The central question is whether NIGCOMSAT can produce a traceable record showing who authorised each consequential step, what process was followed and how those decisions connect from the original government approval to the programme now being implemented.